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The Federal Government and
Environmental Litigation
By KENT FmuZzELu
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article presents an overview of the federal litigation
directly affecting the environment. Essentially it describes the
role of the Department of Justice in the federal program of
improving the environment. It was written from the standpoint
of the Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources Division whose function primarily is litigation and not
administration. The Department of Justice is not engaged in the
administration of environmental programs. The Environmental
Protection Agency and other federal agencies have the administrative and regulatory functions. The Department's function is to
litigate for these agencies. The Department also takes the defensive role in many lawsuits in which it defends governmental programs and projects which have been attacked in the courts. To
perform the legal services necessary, there are about 120 lawyers
in the Land and Natural Resources Division plus 93 United States
Attorneys and their assistants to aid the Department throughout

the country.
II.

THE GOVERNNMENT AS LANDOWNER

By way of background, the United States itself is the principal
landowner in the country; it owns a total of about 750 million
acres.' Because of such large landownership, many problems
peculiar to the United States have arisen relating to the manage* Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, United
States Department of Justice; Attorney General, State of Kansas, 1969-71; J.D.
1955, Washburn University. This article is based upon speeches delivered by Mr.
Frizzell at the Ohio State Bar Association's annual meeting on May 19, 1972, and
at the Eighth Circuit Federal Bar Association Conference on April 21, 1972.
1 PuLic LAND LAW REviEw COMMISSION, ONE THmD oF
NATION'S LAND
(1970) [hereinafter cited as ONE ThmD].
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ment and use of its lands. Much of the Department's litigation
on environmental quality is based on the use of these public lands.
In some states the land owned by the United States is considerable. For example, the percentages of public lands owned in
2
some of the states are:
Alaska
Nevada
Utah
Idaho
California
North Dakota
South Dakota
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
Iowa

96 percent
86 percent
66 percent
63 percent
44 percent
5 percent
7 percent
6 percent
4 percent
1 percent
0.5 percent

Because of dispositions under various laws, 3 the total acreage held
by the federal government is gradually diminishing, notwithstanding federal acquisitions of privately owned land. Each
agency is required to report its holdings to the General Services
Administration as of June 30 of each year. 4 In 1965 their total
land holdings were 765 million acres; six years later, in 1971, the
most recent year for which this massive inventory has been completed, the figure was 760 million acres.' In recent times it has
been only in the period between the 1968 and 1969 inventories
that there was some increase, rather than a decrease, in total
federal land holdings.
In the immediate future federal holdings will decrease sub2

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATiON, INvENTORY REPORT ON REL PnoP
rY
As oF JUNE 30, 1970

OWNED BY THE UNTED STATES THROUGHOUT THE WoRa

(1971)
[hereinafter cited as INvENTony].
3
Principally involved are the Recreation and Public Purposes Act of 1926, 43
U.S.C. §§ 869 et seq. (1970); the surplus property disposal provisions of the
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, 40 U.S.C.
§§ 484 et seq. (1970); the Small Tract Act of 1938, 43 U.S.C. §§ 682(a)-(e)
(1970 ; the Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6, 72 Stat. 339, as
amended, 48 U.S.C. ch. 2 (1970); the mining laws, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21 et
seq. (1970); and, for a time, the temporary Public Land Sale Act of 1964, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1970), which expired in 1970.
4The Government-wide inventory was initiated in 1953, and is being continued pursuant to the desire of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. A
comprehensive history of the inventory program is contained in the Hearings on
H.R. 9131 Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1958).

5 INVENTORY,

supranote 2.
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stantially, particularly because of claims on land in Alaska. In the
Alaska Statehood Act, 6 the Congress pledged 103 million acres
to the new State to form a tax base for it. Of this, 77 million acres
remain to be selected. 7 Another 40 million acres have been provided for selection by natives by the Alaskan Native Claims Act,
enacted last December.8 Much of this land will be claimed this
year because of the expiration of a freeze on land disposal in
Alaska which ended on March 18, 1972, in accordance with a
provision of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act. With the
end of the freeze, which has been in effect since 1968, public
lands in Alaska will also be opened up to claimants under the
mining, homesteading and other laws.9
It may be of interest to note that in 1867 the federal government owned nearly 2 billion acres of public lands, or about 80
percent of the total area of our country.10 The need to populate
these lands and to develop their resources led to the enactment
by the Congress over the years of numerous statutes offering
government owned lands free or with attractive terms to those
who would settle or exploit them." Increasing demands upon
6 Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6, 72 Stat. 339, as amended, 48 U.S.C. ch. 2 (1970).
7H.R. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1971).
8 85 Stat. 688 (1971). The 40 million acres are to be divided among some 220
villages and 12 Regional Corporations. If the entire 40 million acres cannot be
selected from the 25 township areas surrounding the villages, lieu selection areas
are to be withdrawn by the Secretary of the Interior as close to the 25 township
areas as possible. Additionally, the natives will be paid $462,500,000 over an
eleven-year period from funds in the Treasury, and $500,000,000 from mineral
resources received from lands in Alaska to be conveyed to the State under the
Statehood Act and from remaining Federal lands in Alaska, other than a certain
Naval Petroleum Reserve. The State has agreed to this arrangement. Native
claims which are based on aboriginal use and occupancy are declared extinguished
by the
Act, in return for the benefits thereunder.
9
E.g., the mining laws, 30 U.S.C. § 21 et seq. (1970); Homestead Act of
1862, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970), as extended to Alaska by 43 U.S.C. § 270 (1970);
Alaska Trade and Manufacturing Sites Act of 1898, 43 U.S.C. H2 687(a) et seq.
(1970); Alaska Townsites Act, 43 U.S.C. § 732 (1970); Isolated Tract Sales Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970); Small Tract Act, 43 U.S.C. § 683(a)-(e) (1970);
Alaska Public Sales Act, 43 U.S.C. § 687(b); and Recreation and Public Purposes
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 869 (1970).
10 See P. GATES, HIsTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAwV DEVELOPMENT (1968).
"1The Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970), marked the beginning
of this plicy; individuals could acquire up to 160 acres for no charge other than a
filing fee of $10 and a $4 commission, plus an additional $4 commission when
proof of required occupancy and improvement was submitted; areas in excess of
2 million acres were filed upon in every year from 1868 through 1934, when most
remaining public lands were withdrawn from entry. The Desert Land Entry Act
of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. (1970); the Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909,
43 U.S.C. § 218 (1970); and the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 291 et seq. (1970) all provided for larger acquisitions. See P. GATES, HIsTOrY
OF Ptmunc LAND LAw DEvEoPmE
(1968).
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these lands led to more and more laws, which affected fewer and
fewer lands. More than a billion acres have been disposed of
under these laws. Most of these laws, many now obsolete or
obsolescent, are still on the statute books. The Isolated Tract
Sales Act of 1846,2 the Homestead Act of 186213 and the Desert
Land Entry Act of 187714 are striking examples of such statutes.
The Public Land Law Review Commission, created by the
Congress in 1964,'" made a study of unprecedented depth, over a
period of several years, of the hodgepodge system of federal
land laws, culminating with the issuance of its report in June
1970.16 Altogether, the Commission found some 3700 items of

federal enactment. The Commission made numerous recommendations for the modernization of these laws. The Commission's report commences with 18 broad recommendations relating
to future policy respecting public lands. Two of the more
important recommendations are for revision of the policy of
large-scale disposal reflected in the majority of existing statutes,
and for receipt by the Government of full value for the use of
public lands except where there is no consumptive use of the
land or its resources. To implement its policy recommendations,
the Commission offered 137 major recommendations and 250 supplementary recommendations covering every aspect of public
land use, administration, and disposition. One of the strongest
threads running throughout the report involves concern for the

environment in the utilization of the public lands and resources
located thereon. The Commission's recommendations are now
receiving study in the Congress and in the Executive branch.
We can hope that this will lead to a code of federal land laws
suited to the needs of the future.
Sound conservation, development and utilization of remaining
federal lands and their natural resources are essential to the wellbeing of the country. The Government must carefully conserve
and wisely manage this precious heritage for the benefit of all
the people. Because the United States is such a large landowner,
it has become a target of a number of environmental suits. These
12

See 43 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970).

13 See 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).

14 See 43 U.S.C. H§ 321 et seq. (1970).
1543 U.S.C. H§ 1393(a)-(g) (1970).
16 ONE Tmr, supra note 1.
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cases are the newest cases in environmental law, a distinct new
field of litigation. The public has become conscious of the environment; as a consequence, environmental law is developing at
a fast pace.
III. TH-E GOvENI~umNT's RoLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL

LITIGATION

As illustrative of environmental problems in the United States,
the following are the types of legal activities in which the Department of Justice is engaged in the environmental field:
A. The Government as Defendant
On January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed into law the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 1 which declared
that it is the policy of the United States Government to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony. Title I of NEPA recognizes that "each
person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person
has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."' 8 It requires all federal agencies
to take into account the environmental impact of all actions they
propose. Specific directives to prevent adverse environmental
effects of federal agency activities are indicated. Title II created
in the Office of the President a permanent Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) of three members, modeled on the
Council of Economic Advisers. 19 The principal functions of the
Council are to recommend environmental policies to the President
and to assist him in the preparation of an annual environmental
report to be submitted to the Congress beginning in July 1970.
Perhaps the most complex and extensive litigation with
which the Land and Natural Resources Division is concerned
involves Section 102(2) (C) 2 9 of NEPA which provides in pertinent part that all agencies of the Federal Government shall:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig1742 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).

18§ 101(c), 88 Stat. 852.
1942 U.S.C. §§ 4342 et seq. (1970).
2042 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (Supp. 1971).
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nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should if be implemented.
Section 102(2) (C) also requires that the preparing agency,
prior to drafting its detailed statement, solicit the comments of
other federal agencies with expertise and/or jurisdiction over any
of the anticipated environmental impacts. To implement Section
102(2) (C), under authority of Executive Order No. 11514,21 CEQ
issued interim22 and final guidelines 23 to assist the various federal
agencies in preparing their own regulations.
To date there are over 20 court of appeals decisions and 60
district court decisions applying NEPA, many of which are cited
and discussed later in this article. As of June 23, 1972, there were
about 218 NEPA cases in the following categories: approximately
60 involving the Department of Transportation, 43 involving the
Corps of Engineers, 10 involving the Department of Defense,
18 involving the Department of the Interior, 17 involving the
Department of Agriculture, 14 involving the Atomic Energy
Commission, 15 involving the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 10 involving the Environmental Protection Agency,
6 involving the Federal Power Commission, 6 involving the
General Services Administration, with the remainder divided
among a scattering of agencies. The bulk of these cases are
handled by the Land and Natural Resources Division of the
Department of Justice.
A variety of complex and often interrelated issues, such as
the following, are presented in NEPA litigation:
2185 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970).
22

35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).

23 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
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1. Obviously, NEPA does not require an environmental statement for every federal action. Section 102(2) (C) speaks in
terms of "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." The answer to the basic question
of how large a project must be before it is considered a "major
action" with "significant impact" would vary from department to
department as each applies NEPA to its own activities and
problems.2 4 An agency determination in this regard should be
entitled to "great deference"2 5 and not be subject to judicial
reversal unless arbitrary or capricious.
In Citizens for Reid State Park,26 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the Defense Department from carrying out a mock amphibious
landing on the beaches of Reid State Park in Georgetown, Maine,
as a part of a combined sea, air and amphibious training
maneuver. A negative determination was made by the agency
as to the applicability of Section 102(2) (C) and the court held
that the scope of review was limited, that the decision was not
arbitrary or reached without adequate consideration of environmental factors, and that the record clearly warranted the Navy's
determination that any potential environmental damage to the
park from the maneuver was insignificant.
2. The applicability of NEPA to ongoing projects or programs
at the time of enactment is also an issue. At the time NEPA was
enacted many governmental programs and projects were at
various stages of operation or completion. For many of these
projects, a question arose as to the applicability of NEPA.27 In
essence, the case law appears to restate provision 11 of the CEQ
guidelines:
Application of section 102(2)(C) procedureto existing projects and programs. To the maximum extent practicable the
24
E.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid
State Park v. Laird, 356 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972); Save Our Ten Acres v.
Kreger 2 ELR 20305 (S.D. Ala. decided April 7, 1972), appeal filed 5th Cir.,
No. 72-2165.
25
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
26
336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
27
E.g., Pennsylvania Environmental Counsel v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d
Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers (Gillham Dam),
325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971), iniunction vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (1972),
appeal filed 8th Cir., No. 72-1326; Calvert Cliffs v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1823 (4th Cir.
1972); Ragland v. Mueller 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1972); Environmental Law
Fund v. Volpe, 3 ERC 1941 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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section 102(2) (C) procedure should be applied to further
major Federal actions having a significant effect on the environment even though they arise from projects or programs
initiated prior to enactment of the Act of January 1, 1970.
Where it is not practicable to reassess the basic course of action, it is still important that further incremental major actions
be shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental consequences ....

or program.

28

not fully evaluated at the outset of the project

3. Whether or not specific agency activity is exempt from
the application of NEPA has also been litigated. There are a
number of instances where federal agencies have claimed that
certain activities or programs are exempt from NEPA.2 9
4. The content of environmental statements has been questioned. An impact statement is a guarantee that the significant
environmental impacts of any particular project and alternatives
have been thought about and weighed in the decisionmaking
process. As one court put it:
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure
law. The Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to
alter the then existing decisionmaking responsibilities or to
take away any then existing freedom of decisionmaking, but it
certainly intended to make such decisionmaking more responsible .... 30
The statement should not be an exhaustive collection of various
and sundry minute scientific descriptive details which, though
satisfying to a scientist's inquisitiveness and extensive factgathering processes, would likely be confusing to the decisionmakers and apt to miss the focus NEPA sought to achieve. The
role of the impact statement is to reasonably identify relevant
36 Fed. Reg. 7727 (1971).
E. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971), appeal filed sub. nom. Froehlke v Kalur, No. 72-1413,
(D.C. Cir. 1972), Davis v. Morton, 335 F. Supp. 1258 (D.N.M. 1971); Port
Authority v. United States, 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1971); Cohen v. Price Comm'n,
3 ERC 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States, 4 ERC 1312 (D.D.C. 1972), appeal filed by United
States and Interstate Commerce Commission (S. Ct. No. 72-535).
28
29

30

Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 759

(E.D. Ark. 1972), injunction vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), appeal
filed 8th Cir., No. 72-1326. See also Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp.

222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 4 ERC 1044 (4th Cir. 1972).
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environmental concerns in project evaluation. The nature of the
impact statement was discussed recently in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg (Amchitka), 31 where the court
noted that it is not its duty to rule on the relative merit of competing scientific opinion. The statement was intended to provide
for the deciding officials reference to the existence of responsible
scientific opinions concerning possible adverse environmental
effects. Only responsible opposing views, the court noted, need
be included, and hence there is room for discretion on the part of
the officials preparing the statement. The agency need not set
forth at full length views with which it disagrees, all that is
required is a meaningful reference that identifies the problem
at hand for the responsible official. The agency, the court concluded, is not foreclosed from noting in the statement that it
accepts certain contentions or rejects others.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,32 the
court noted that the requirement that NEPA be complied with
"to the fullest extent possible" is neither "rubber" nor "iron":
The statute must be construed in light of reason if it is not to
demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible,
given the obvious, that the resources of energy and research
-and time-available to meet the Nation's needs are not
33
infinite.
The court concluded:
So long as the officials and agencies have taken the "hard
look" at environmental consequences mandated by Congress,
the court does not seek to impose unreasonable extremes or
of the executive
to interject itself within the area of discretion
34
as to the choice of the action to be taken.
In Natural Resources Defense Council the Government had taken
an appeal from a decision of the district court granting plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction, which held up the proposed
sale by the Department of the Interior of leases to approximately
80 tracts of submerged lands on the outer continental shelf for
31 3 ERC 1126, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

32458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33 Id. at 837.
34Id.at 838.
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oil and gas production. The district court found that the environmental impact statement filed pursuant to NEPA was defective
in that it did not discuss some alternatives listed in it, and failed
to discuss in detail the environmental impacts of the alternatives

listed. 5
The court of appeals denied the Government's motion for
summary reversal of the injunction. In so holding, the court
found that:
The impact statement provides a basis for (a) evaluation of
the benefits of the proposed project in light of its environmental risks, and (b) comparison of the net balance for the
proposed project with the environmental risks presented by
alternative courses of action. 36

Therefore, it held that the discussion of the environmental impacts
of alternative actions, as well as of the proposed action, is necessary to satisfy NEPA. Further, the court noted that the discussion
of alternatives in regard to this particular proposal must encom37
pass practically all aspects of the national energy posture.
Since the Energy Subcommittee of the Domestic Council (designated by the President as the body with the power to make overall policy in this field) had not issued an impact statement on
the decision to proceed with offshore leasing rather than to change
import quotas, it fell to Interior when implementing that policy
to evaluate the environmental impact of reasonable alternatives,
even though their implementation lies beyond the scope of
Interior. The court reasoned that, in addition to disclosing the
thinking of the agency in making its proposal, the impact statement serves as a guide for the ultimate decisionmakers who
must decide between various alternatives within the purview of
different agencies.3 8
The court established a rule of reasonableness as to the extent
to which various types of alternatives must be evaluated, pointing
out that, in regard to alternatives beyond the authority of the
responsible official, reference can be made to other studies, including other impact statements. 9 In addition, the court held
85 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971).
36458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37 Id. at 834-38.
38Id. at 833.
89 Id. at 836.
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that past determinations by Congress and the President involved
here (the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act4" and the
mandatory oil import program instituted by the President pursuant to congressional authority),41 regardless of the urgency
embodied therein, do not override the need for review of the
environmental impact of alternatives under NEPA. Rather, NEPA
merely infused another element in the continuous review of these
programs contemplated by Congress. 2
5. Another problem area has been citizen participation in
NEPA. Agency regulations on the preparation of environmental
statements, in accordance with CEQ guidelines, generally require
the filing of, first, a draft environmental statement and, subsequently, a final environmental statement. The draft statement
is available to citizens and citizen groups who are free to examine
it. Where members of the public have had an opportunity to
comment on a draft environmental statement and have not done
so, they should be precluded from initiating any judicial attack
on the activity involved. To allow plaintiffs under such circumstances to initiate judicial proceedings would thwart the administrative process and be in violation of the doctrines of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and laches. 43 As to public hearings
on federal activities, NEPA does not establish such a right. As
stated in National Helium Corp. v. Morton,44 neither NEPA nor
the Administrative Procedure Act compels extensive administrative proceedings or hearings. "There is no indication that Congress in enacting the NEPA intended to impose extensive procedural impediments to Department action."45
6. Finally, the preparation of environmental statements may
come under attack. The CEQ guidelines provide that where
several federal agencies are involved in a federal action for which
an environmental statement is required, the lead agency should
prepare the statement. The leading case on this issue of who
4043 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1970).
41 See the President's June 4, 1971, Message on Supply of Energy and Clean

Air, 112 CONG. REC. 8313, 8313-17 (1971).

42
458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
43
Cf. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971), appeal filed
sub. nom. Sierra Club v. Butz, No. 71-2514 (9th Cir. 1972).
44 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton,
3 ERC 1919 (D. Ariz. 1972), appeal filed, No. 72-1634 (9th Cir. 1972).
45 455 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1971).
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is the lead agency is Upper Pecos Association v. Stans,4 6 in which
the Upper Pecos Association sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against the Department of Commerce and its
Economic Development Administration (EDA) on the ground
that EDA's funding of 80 percent of the cost of a road through
part of a national forest was a violation of NEPA. The association contended that the granting of this money for the road was
a "major federal action," requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement by EDA.47 The Tenth Circuit affirmed
the finding of the trial court that the Forest Service, as the agency
charged with the construction of the road, was the 'lead agency"
and, therefore, was the agency with the responsibility to prepare
the environmental impact statement. The court stated that the
Forest Service has a continuing commitment to the course of
action to build the road, and also has the expertise to prepare
the statement which sets forth the various alternatives to the
48
project.
Furthermore, the court rejected the Association's contention
that preparation of the statement after the grant had been made
was a meaningless gesture. It stated that "the project must be of
sufficient definiteness before an evaluation of its environmental
impact can be made and alternatives proposed." 49 Since the Forest
Service must still approve the location of the road and grant the
necessary right-of-way easements for its construction, the impact
statement prepared by the Forest Service will provide the basis
on which that agency will make the final determinations."0
Therefore, the court found no violations of NEPA and denied
the Association's motions for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the project.
As to the preparation of the draft environmental statements
by the applicant, the Second Circuit, in Greene County Planning
Board v. Federal Power Commission,51 held that the Federal
Power Commission may not delegate the responsibility of preparation of draft environmental statements to applicants for a license.
46452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3553 (U.S.
May 22, 1972).
47

Id. at 1235.

48 Id. at 1236.
49 Id. at 1236-37.
o Id.at 1237.
51455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, -U.S.L.W.-

(U.S. Oct. 10, 1972).
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The decision acknowledges that basic data can come from the
applicant, but the preparation of the statement itself should be
done by the agency:
NEPA places the onus of formulating the statement solely on
the Commission, and, unless there is any indication that the
Commission's procedures will not allow it to comply with its
statutory duty this Court should defer to the Commission's
discretion as to the proper information gathering tech-

niques. 52

The Land and Natural Resources Division does more than just
litigate suits involving NEPA. Other statutes are invoked by
environmental groups. In Sierra Club v. Morton,5 3 the Disneyland
Company of California was granted a lease (after competitive
bids) on a large acreage in the mountains west of Fresno, California, to build a $32,000,000 ski resort. An environmental group,
the Sierra Club, filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Agriculture to stop the issuance of a permit
for the project. The Sierra Club alleged that the manner in which
the leases were granted Disneyland by the Government violated
federal statutes governing the management of national forests
and parks. Plaintiff's main purpose in filing suit was to preserve
the area as a wilderness, instead of permitting its conversion
into a ski area. The district court stopped the project by an
injunction. The Government appealed and the Ninth Circuit
sustained the legality of the actions of the Departments of the
Interior and Agriculture and held that the Sierra Club did not
have the requisite standing to bring the action. 54 The Sierra
Club's petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court,5 5
oral arguments were heard, and on April 19, 1972, the Court
came down with its decision affirming the ruling of the Ninth
Circuit that the Sierra Club had not alleged a sufficient stake
in the area affected to have standing to bring the action. As the
52455 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1972). See Pizitz v. Volpe, No. 72-1995 (5th
Cir. July 11, 1972), where the court held that the Federal Highway Administration
coula accept an environmental impact statement prepared by a state highway
department. Contra, Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, No. 72-C-00
(E.D. Wis., July 20, 1972); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1329
D. Conn. 1972).
5 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
54 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
55 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
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Court stated: "The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its
members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes
by the Disney development."56 The Court observed that "a mere
'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the
interest
and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the
problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization
'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within the meaning of
the
Administrative Procedure Act."5 7
Although the decision defeated the standing of the Sierra
Club in that case, it made clear that individuals and groups may
have standing to litigate matters where they have noneconomic
interests. As the Court said:
Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic wellbeing, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them
less deserving of legal protection through the judicial proc8
ess. 5
The Court also observed that an individual or group which
establishes its standing is not limited to asserting only its own
interests in the matter; it can argue the public interest in support
of its claim that the agency has failed to comply with its statutory
mandate. The Court further noted that the test to establish
standing would not insulate executive action from judicial review
nor would it prevent any public interests from being protected
through the judicial process. The significance of the standing
test, the Court said, is to "serve as at least a rough attempt to put
the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of
those who have a direct stake in the outcome." 9
Even though the Government's posture in a lawsuit is that of
defendant, its role is to protect the public interest and balance
social and economic factors along with environmental considerations. Frequently the suit is brought because some private party
or group is attempting to overturn an administrative decision
which was based upon careful and thoughtful planning and
56

Sierra
5"Id.at
58 Id. at
69Id. at

Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
739.
734.
740.
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balancing and good ecomanagement and simply does not meet
plaintiff's special interests. In addition to many of the cases cited
above, an excellent example of this is the case of Zabel v. Tabb,60
in which the Corps of Army Engineers denied a permit to dredge
and fill navigable waters. In Zabel the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that the Corps was not limited to consideration of navigation, flood control and hydroelectric potential
when issuing such permits. The Fifth Circuit held that the Corps
may deny such permits on environmental grounds alone.
B. The Government as Plaintiff
The three basic statutes under which the Government acts as
plaintiff in protection of the environment are (1) Section 13 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,61 commonly referred to as
the Refuse Act, (2) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,6
63
and (3) the Clean Air Act.
The Refuse Act makes it unlawful to discharge "any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a
liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States,"
except as authorized by the Secretary of the Army.64 For violations of the Act, the federal government may, by the express terms
of another section of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, seek
criminal penalties in terms of fines and imprisonment. 5 In 1970,
however, the Department of Justice commenced using the Refuse
Act as a basis for filing civil actions to enjoin pollution. The
first such action was filed on March 13, 1970, against the Florida
Power and Light Company in Miami, Florida, to enjoin massive
discharges of heated water into Biscayne Bay. 66 The case was
settled on September 10, 1971, by entry of a consent decree
requiring the company to construct, under court supervision, at
60430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
6133 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
62 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151 etseq. (1972).
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
64 33 U.S.C. § 407. Over the years, the courts have read the Act expansively.
E.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 328 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ind. 1970). See generally Tripp & Hall, Federal
Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 60 (1970).

65 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).

66 United States v. Florida Power &Light Co., Civil No. 70-328-Civ-CA (S.D.
Fla., filed Mar. 13, 1970).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

a cost in excess of $25,000,000, a system to cool and recycle the
heated water.
As of July 26, 1972, approximately 125 other civil injunctive
suits under the Refuse Act had been filed, including, in February,
an injunctive suit to abate the discharge by the Reserve Mining
Company of 67,000 tons per day of taconite tailings into Lake
Superior.6 7 Of the civil injunctive cases filed, about 80 have been
concluded by the entry of decrees, all of which require either the
immediate cessation of the discharges, or the installation of
pollution abatement equipment-often at great cost.
In addition, criminal litigation under the Refuse Act has been
accelerated. Whereas as few as 15 and no more than 56 criminal
actions under the Refuse Act had been filed during any one year
in the fiscal years 1961 through 1969, 129 such actions were filed
in fiscal year 1970, and 191 such actions were filed in fiscal year
1971.68 There were 59 convictions under this statute in fiscal
1970, and 127 convictions in fiscal 1971.69 Only a few months ago
a large company (Anaconda Wire & Cable) was convicted of 100
violations of the Refuse Act, and a fine of $200,000 was imposed
by the court;70 this was by far the largest fine ever imposed under
the Refuse Act at one time against one defendant.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act provides two enforcement mechanisms for pollution abatement by the federal
government. The first is a three-step procedure consisting of a
conference of federal, state, and interstate water quality agency
representatives, a public hearing, and finally, court action.7 1 The
second enforcement procedure calls for notification both to the
violator of water quality standards and to interested parties,
followed by court action if necessary.7 2 To date only two cases
have been referred to the Attorney General for adjudication
under the Act: one in 1960, against the City of St. Joseph, Missouri,73 and one more recently, against Reserve Mining Company,
74
in Minnesota.
67 United States v. Reserve Mining Co., Civil No. 5-72-Civ.-19 (D. Minn.,
filed Feb. 17, 1972). The complaint alleges violations of both the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and the Refuse Act.
68 1961-1971 Ar'y GEN. ANN. REa.
69 1970-1971 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP.
70 United States v. Anaconda Wire & Cable, 4 ERC 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
713
U.S.C. §§ 1160(d)-(f) (1970).
7233

U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970).

(Continued on next page)
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The Clean Air Act was changed dramatically when the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 became law. In the past, air pollution was regulated primarily by state and local authorities.
The Act authorizes national standards and calls for national air
quality standards on certain pollutants designated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 7 It sets a deadline for
primary standards-those designed to protect health. Significant
new sources of air pollution, such as new power plants and

smelters, and both new and old sources of hazardous air pollutants will fall under national emission standards.70 The Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 are an example of a recent shift in
burden of proof in pollution control. Once the EPA administrator
tags an air pollutant as hazardous, he may, after giving notice,
publish emission standards. 77 Then any objector must establish
"that such pollutant clearly is not a hazardous air pollutant."78
To date, only one request for action following a conference or
standard-setting procedure has ever been referred to the Attorney
General: United States v. Bishop Processing.79 In that case, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, which
provided that the company cease all manufacturing and processing
in its chicken rendering plant.
IV.

FEDERAL

LAND AcQuIsIoN

The acquisition of lands for federal public purposes and the
uses made thereof for the public benefit usually have material
effects upon the human environment. The Land and Natural
Resources Division of the Department of Justice is presently
involved in the prosecution of condemnation proceedings to
acquire approximately 15,000 individual tracts of land for such
purposes. One of the primary purposes in acquiring privately
owned lands by the United States Government is flood control.
(Footnote continued 'from preceding page)
73

United States v. City of St. Joseph, Civil No. 1077 (W.D. Mo. filed August,

1960).
74

United States v. Reserve Mining Co., Civil No. 5-72-Civ.-19 (D. Minn.,
filed Feb. 17, 1972).
75 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
76 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c) (4) (Supp. 1971).

7742 U.S.C. § 1857(c)(7) (Supp. 1971).

78Id.
79287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968), af'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.

denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
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Dam and reservoir projects, however, not only control floods, but
also create beautiful recreation areas, thereby improving and
enhancing the environment.
One of the largest of multi-purpose projects now underway is
designated the Tocks Island Dam and Reservoir Project-Delaware
Water Gap National Recreation Project, located on the boundary
between Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The total estimated cost
of this project is $500 million. When this project is completed,
it will create one of the largest recreational areas for the millions
of people in the metropolitan areas of northern New Jersey, southeastern New York and northeastern Pennsylvania. The Land
Acquisition Section of the Land and Natural Resources Division
is now handling the condemnation proceedings for the Corps of
Engineers of the Department of the Army on approximately 100
dam projects throughout the United States. These projects will
involve the acquisition of many thousands of acres of land. If
voluntary conveyance of these acres cannot be achieved by the
agency primarily responsible for land acquisition, the Land and
Natural Resources Division is authorized to acquire the land by
eminent domain proceedings.
The value of these dam projects has been questioned by
many environmental groups. Prior to the institution of condemnation proceedings to acquire properties, the acquiring agency
is requested to furnish information as to the actions taken to
comply with the provisions of NEPA. In United States v. 247.37
Acres of Land, 0 the court vacated an earlier decision allowing
United States condemnation of land for a flood control project,
on grounds that NEPA had not been complied with. In Zlotnick
v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,"' it was
held that land speculators who brought an action to enjoin condemnation proceedings did not have standing to raise the issue
of compliance with NEPA because they were merely seeking
enhanced payment for their land from the agency.
To demonstrate some of the environmental benefits from the
Corps of Engineers projects, the Corps has cited the following:
The Federal Government's top recreation host, the Army
Corps of Engineers, recorded 276 million visits at 319 lakes
80 3 ERC 1098 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
81 2 ELR 20235 (D.D.C. 1972),

appeal filed, D.C. Cir., No. 72-1345.
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during 1970-up more than 7.5 percent over the record-year
1969. Camper days at 185 Corps project areas, where camping
is permitted, were recorded at 43 million in 1970.
Lake Sidney Lanier, formed by Buford Dam on the
Cattahooche River in Georgia, again headed the list with
11,737,000 visits recorded, an increase of nearly 800,000 over
the previous year.
Lake Texoma on the Red River in Texas recorded the
highest number of camper days, 7,637,500 during the year.
In addition to Lake Sidney Lanier's high visitation, 16
projects recorded more than 8 million visits and 30 recorded
over 2 million. An additional 35 projects recorded visits in
excess of 1 million.
Although the primary purposes of the man-made lakes
built by the Corps are for other than recreation, the projects
have become the Nation's most popular and heaviest visited
recreation areas.
The Corps' lakes have been acclaimed among the best fishing areas in the Nation by the country's leading outdoors
sports magazines, and by leading sport fishermen. Nearly 54
million pounds 2 of sport fish were caught in the man-made
8
lakes last year.
The federal government is in the process of acquiring by
eminent domain ocean or lake front areas for recreational purposes in the following areas:83

State
California
California
Florida
Florida & Mississippi
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
New York

Project
Point Reyes National Seashore Area
Whiskeytown National Recreation Area
Biscayne Bay National Park
Gulf Islands National Seashore
Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore
Assateague Island National Seashore
Cape Cod National Seashore Area
Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore
Fire Island National Seashore

The federal government is considering sites for rapid transit
systems in an effort to reduce pollution caused by automobiles in
8

2

(1970).
83

Comps

OF ENGIEERs, STATISTICAL REPORT, WATEa RFsouRcEs PROJECTS

Records, Department of Justice.
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congested city areas. Several cities have studied the total or
partial ban of the use of automobiles in certain areas. Great
strides are being made in the metropolitan area of the District
of Columbia which will materially aid in reducing the pollution
problem. Under a compact composed of the District of Columbia
and the States of Maryland and Virginia, 4 each participating
entity is paying a part of the cost of constructing a rapid rail
transit system in these jurisdictions; however, the United States
is paying the greatest portion of such costs. It is estimated that
1,302 parcels of land will be acquired for the location of the
transit system and related facilities at a cost of approximately
$200,170,000. The Land and Natural Resources Division is
charged with the responsibility of prosecuting condemnation
proceedings to acquire these properties, which involve many
parcels of great value. In addition, the Division is often requested
to acquire more land for new and improved post offices, federal
court buildings, harbor sites, and irrigation projects. These are
planned and programmed with the interest and purpose of creating a better environment. The total spent for these land acquisition projects is as follows:"'

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Total

$171,826,973.43
183,440,371.26
175,892,775.19
161,216,596.38
170,792,833.20
$862,669,549.46

Many of the lands being acquired for federal public purposes
are very valuable, and frequently excessive claims are made by
property owners. Presently, claims are being asserted in amounts
approximating $45 million. Claims involving many millions of
dollars have been asserted in actions against the United States
for lands included in a legislative taldng for the Redwoods
National Park in the State of California."6
84
The Washington-Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was created effective
February 20, 1967, by interstate compact between Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia pursuant to Pub. L. No. 89-774 (approved Nov. 6, 1966).
85 Records, Department of Justice.
86 E.g., Rocca v. United States, No. 27-70 (Ct. Cl., filed Jan. 29, 1970);
Arcata Nat'l Corp. v. United States, No. 777-71 (Ct Cl., ified Oct. 19, 1971).
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CONCLUSION

As noted, this is only a brief outline of what is being done in
the area of environmental litigation and public land law by the
federal government. One thing, however, is clear: man has created
the environmental problems we have today and man can solve
them. The essayist E.B. White has observed, "Our approach to
nature is to beat it into submission." Perhaps that is changing
now. As Rachel Carson noted in Silent Spring (1962):
We stand now where two roads diverge. But unlike the
roads in Robert Frost's familiar poem, they are not equally
fair. The road we have long been traveling is deceptively
easy, a smooth superhighway on which we progress with great
speed, but at its end lies disaster. The other fork of the road
-the one 'less traveled by-offers our last, our only chance to
reach a destination that assures the preservation of our earth.

